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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
liberty. State v. Parsons (1913) 153 Wis. 20, 139 N. W. 825; State v.
Tineher (1914) 258 Mo. 1, 166 S. W. 1028.
Another objection that has been raised in analogous cases is that an act
such as the juvenile court act, by conferring upon a special court the
power to deal with a certain class of cases, limits and impairs the juris-
diction given to the courts of general jurisdiction by the state constitution;
but this question has been decided in the negative. De May v. Liberty
Foundry Co. (Mo. 1931) 37 S. W. (2d) 640. H. H. G., '33.
REAL PROPERTY-DowER RIGHTS-NECESSITY OF JOINDER OF HUSBAND IN A
DEED OF CONVEYANCE.-In an action of ejectment brought by the grantee
of the deceased wife of defendant, the defense was that under the statute
abolishing tenancy by the curtesy and granting in lieu thereof a right in
the widower to the same share in the deceased wife's real estate as the law
provides for the widow in the real estate of her deceased husband, it was
necessary for the husband to join in his wife's deed of conveyance. Held,
that such statutory provision does not change the prior interpretation of
the Married Woman's Act, R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 2998 and 3003, to the
effect that the husband need not join in the deed of conveyance where the
wife conveys property owned in her own right. Scott v. Scott et al. (1930)
324 Mo. 1055, 26 S. W. (2d) 598.
Prior to 1889, Missouri followed the common-law rule that a husband's
right of curtesy would not be prejudiced by a deed of conveyance of the real
estate owned by the wife in her own right in the event that the husband
were not joined in the deed. Clay v. Mayr (1898) 144 Mo. 376, 46 S. W.
157; Kennedy v. Koopman (1901) 166 Mo. 87, 65 S. W. 1020. In 1889 the
Missouri Legislature enacted the Married Woman's Act, noted above, which
provided that "a married woman shall be deemed a femme sole so far as
to enable her to carry on and transact business on her own account, to con-
tract and be contracted with, to sue and be sued, and to enforce and have
enforced against her property such judgment as may be rendered for or
against her, and may sue. and be sued at law or in equity, with or without
her husband being joined as a party." Whether a wife, owning property in
her own right might, without joining her husband, convey title unineum-
bered by curtesy right first arose in Brook v. Barker (1921) 287 Mo. 13,
228 S. W. 805, where the court held the husband's joinder unnecessary. The
ruling was based chiefly upon a prior decision rendered in Bank v. Hageluken
(1901) 165 Mo. 443, 65 S. W. 728, and upon subsequent decisions which
cited the Hageluken case with approval, such as Riggs v. Price (1919) 277
Mo. 333, 210 S. W. 420; Kirkpatrick v. Pease (1907) 202 Mo. 471, 101
S. W. 651; First National Bank v. Kirby (1916) 269 Mo. 285, 190 S. W.
597. The court in the Hageluken case, above, states the view of the Mis-
souri courts with reference to the statute, that its effect is to confer on a
married woman the legal estate in her land in as full and complete manner
and degree as if she were a femme sole.
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The contention of the defendant in the principal case is that since the
statute abolishing tenancy by the curtesy gives the widower the same right
in real estate as his wife would have had in his estate, and since the wife's
right cannot be affected by a conveyance of the husband alone, R. S. Mo.
(1929) sec. 318, it necessarily follows that the husband's right cannot be
prejudiced by a conveyance of the wife alone. To hold otherwise would be
to assert in the wife a greater estate in the husband's realty than he would
have in the wife's realty. But the court held that the only effect of the
statute was to change the character and quantum of" interest a husband
takes in the lands which his wife owned at the date of her death, and that
it does not attempt to modify or take away the right given a married
woman by the Married Woman's Act to dispose of the whole title to her
separate real estate without joinder of her husband in the deed of con-
veyance. But the Married Woman's Act did not expressly give the right
to the wife to convey her property without joinder. Brook v. Barker, above.
The net effect, therefore, is that the decision in the principal case is reached
by building an assumption on an assumption.
Kentucky, Iowa and Illinois have statutes similar to the one here in
issue. Combs v. Ezell (Ky. 1930) 24 S. W. (2d) 301, holds that the hus-
band's joinder is necessary, but the decision is predicated upon an express
statute to that effect. Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1922) sec. 2128. In Illinois, the
issue is settled also by an additional statute requiring such joinder. R. S.
Ill. (Cahill, 1929) c. 41 sec. 16. In Iowa the point does not seem to have
been settled by an adjudicated case. H. K. M., '33.
TRADEMARKs-ASSIGNAaILITY-NECESSITY OF DISCLOSURE OF SECRET PROC-
Ess.-The question of whether the assignment of a trademark is valid
when the secret process of manufacture is not also assigned was decided
for the first time in this country in Mulhens & Kropff, Inc. v. Ferd. Muel-
hens, Inc. (C. C. A. 2, 1930) 43 F. (2d) 937, rev'g (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1929)
38 F. (2d) 287; motion to make more specific denied (C. C. A. 2, 1931) 48
F. (2d) 206; certiorari denied (1931) 51 S. Ct. 84.
Kropff and Ferd. Muelhens had been partners in selling in this country
products manufactured by Muelhens in Germany, in accordance with a
secret recipe known only to Muelhens, and sold under the trademark
"4711." A dissolution of the partnership was occasioned by the World
War, and the Alien Property Custodian, under authority of the Trading
With the Enemy Act [40 Stat. 411 (1917) 50 U. S. C. A. sec. 30, 6] sold the
interest of Ferd. Muelhens to Kropff, who manufactured very similar
products under the old name of Mulhens & Kropff, now a corporation, and
sold them under the mark "4711" with the statement that they were made
according to the secret process. After the War, Ferd. Muelhens, Inc., was
organized as selling agent of the German house, and it, too, sold its products
in this country under the mark "4711," advertising Mulhens & Kropff's
claim to the formula to be false. In an action by Mulhens & Kropff, Inc.,
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